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Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that compromise among poli-
ticians and law-makers is necessary for democracy in circumstances of 
persistent and intractable reasonable disagreement, and that a rejection of 
compromise biases politics in favour of the status quo and therefore stands 
in the way of desirable change. They criticize American politicians for 
their uncompromising attitude, and attribute it to the spirit of “permanent 
campaign” (4). Drawing nuanced lessons from historical compromises and 
failures to compromise in American politics since the 1980s, the authors 
then propose changes in political institutions and processes to strengthen 
what they refer to as the “compromising mindset” (3) and to obtain a better 
balance between campaigning and governing.
The Spirit of Compromise is an interesting example of a new genre of 
books published by political theorists lately that aims at providing a non-ideal 
and more institutionally attuned assessment of democratic politics. Actually, 
at places, it seems to have been written primarily for a non-philosophical 
audience. The book succeeds, however, in delivering both a careful theoreti-
cal argument in its first chapters—albeit mostly in the endnotes—and a 
nuanced practical assessment of each theoretical statement in light of con-
crete examples throughout the book, concluding with timely proposals for 
institutional reform. This unique combination of political theory and practice 
distinguishes the book from previously published studies on compromise, 
even though the main line of theoretical argument is not that novel. 
Regrettably, the argument focuses primarily on American politics. Although 
the authors do not exclude the application of its conclusions to other demo-
cratic polities (24, 165), they do not provide any discussion of comparative 
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politics or of concrete non-American examples—except by foreseeing their 
progressive “Americanization” (165).
In this review, I concentrate on three issues: the notion of compromise, the 
justification of compromise, and the institutions of compromise.
First, the notion of compromise: Gutmann and Thompson define compro-
mise as “an agreement in which all sides sacrifice something in order to 
improve on the status quo from their perspective, and in which sacrifices are 
at least partly determined by the other side’s will” (10). More specifically, the 
two authors are concerned with the kind of compromises that occur in demo-
cratic politics (10), and in particular legislative compromises, that is, “agree-
ments that produce laws” (11) and that are made by law-makers, that is, mostly 
legislative representatives (47)—although the authors also refer to citizens in 
some cases (117, 206). Unlike other forms of compromise and in particular 
private compromises or ad hoc political compromises, legislative compro-
mises take place “in an ongoing institution in which the members have respon-
sibilities to constituents and their political parties, maintain continuing 
relationships with one another, and deal concurrently with a wide range of 
issues that have multiple parts and long-range effects” (11). Legislative com-
promises are mostly “classic compromises” where sacrifices have to be made 
on both sides, and it is difficult, they say, to find other kinds of compromises 
such as “consensual compromises” and “integrative compromises” in legisla-
tive politics (12–15). In terms of content, the authors’ core interest is in those 
legislative compromises that pertain to justice and other moral concerns rather 
than compromises of interests, and they consider that “political compromises 
are usually a mélange of measures that reflect conflicting values that no set of 
moral standards can consistently encompass” (80).
Interestingly, at various places in their argument, Gutmann and Thompson 
define compromise by reference to “status quo,” itself defined as standing in 
the way of “desirable change” or “reform” (32). They seem to be packing too 
much into the notions of change and its desirability. While the authors rightly 
emphasize the ambivalence of compromise that is always something valuable 
and something to be resisted, they are particularly unambivalent about the 
value of change. They even argue later on in the book that compromise 
“opens up opportunities to promote greater justice” (101). This default under-
standing of the value of reform and its centrality to their notion of compro-
mise are particularly problematic for Gutmann and Thompson’s refutation of 
Ronald Dworkin’s argument against internal or checkerboard compromises 
(81–84, 208). The authors argue that “to judge compromises as acceptable 
only if they are consistent with a coherent standard is to put the compro-
mise—but not the status quo—on the moral defensive” (81). The same 
applies, they say, to Dworkin’s “ideal of integrity” that puts “the state’s action 
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on the defensive” (83). Here, one cannot fail to wonder why the authors 
assume compromise is the only way to trigger “change” (e.g., 32), and what 
makes change “desirable” in the first place (e.g., 41). After all, less compro-
mise will ensure more coherence in the law in the long run, even if it means 
sticking to a compromised status quo; following Joseph Raz on the “partial 
reform dilemma,” one may argue indeed that it is easier to cohere with past 
laws in the long run the lesser compromised they are.
In sum, the difficulty with Gutmann and Thompson’s default compromis-
ing mindset is that it sets the priority of change as necessarily desirable over 
status quo by default and against what they see as the sole alternative, that is, 
status quo over change by default (e.g., 108–9). However, either may be mor-
ally justified depending on the circumstances of the case, and choosing one 
mindset over the other blinds us to their potential justifications. The compro-
mising mindset may be said to be particularly uncompromising, as a result.
Second, the justification of compromise: Gutmann and Thompson advance 
justifications for and against compromise. They claim, like many before 
them, that compromises are valuable in the abstract even if they cannot 
always be justified in concrete cases (27–29, 35, 49–50). They then rightly 
reject the interests-versus-principle argument against all legislative compro-
mises over questions of principle. It may have been interesting for them, 
however, to dwell deeper into the latter argument from the perspective of 
legal philosophy, especially since their object is legislative compromising: 
there, the question of a justified resolution of conflicts of principle, and con-
flicts of human rights duties in particular, has given rise to very nuanced 
treatments.
Interestingly, the authors, as democratic theorists and deliberative demo-
cratic theorists in particular, see a close connection between the justification 
of compromise and democracy (22–23). In fact, that connection actually 
underpins almost all of their arguments for the compromising mindset (1–2, 
204). With respect to the relationship between compromise and democracy, 
Gutmann and Thompson seem to be saying that the relationship is instrumen-
tal (2), but it remains unclear in which direction the instrumental relationship 
goes (e.g., 85), and why it is so. In particular, the association of democracy 
with change and overcoming the status quo (30), that plays an important role 
in the connection between compromise and democracy, remains unaccounted 
for (e.g. 84–85). Furthermore, there are other ways of triggering change 
through democratic processes than internal compromises of justice; follow-
ing many other authors, one may even regard democracy as a form of exter-
nal compromise qua decision-making process over which scheme of justice 
to choose, without, however, necessarily opting for an internally compro-
mised outcome (contra 220 fn 11). And there are other dimensions of 
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democracy that may conflict with compromising. One may think here of 
deliberation itself. Of course, Gutmann and Thompson define compromise in 
terms of principled prudence and of mutual respect (16–17, 100) and then 
point to the perfect correspondence with the very same requirements of dem-
ocratic deliberation they have defined in previous work (34–35, 84–85). To 
those who have not read their previous argument or do not endorse it, how-
ever, the book’s argument is strangely amputated. It is not clear why delibera-
tion has to lead to mutual accommodation, and why mutual accommodation 
requires mutual sacrifices rather than agreement on common ground or on 
one of the principles at stake. This is particularly important if one is to apply 
some of the proposals developed in the book outside the United States: there, 
the relationship between other forms of direct democracy, in particular non-
electoral political participation, and compromise would have to be seen in a 
different light.
Finally, the institutions of compromise: Gutmann and Thompson focus 
on compromise in law-making. This is the kind of politics and hence of 
institutions they have in mind (11). More specifically, they claim they want 
to focus on the U.S. Congress (12). As legal theorizing on compromises is 
still quite limited to date—except for Ronald Dworkin’s work—this is a 
very welcome contribution. However, one may have wished for a more 
detailed discussion of what differentiates legislative and, more generally, 
legal compromises from other political compromises in a democracy. Even 
more so after the authors have considered, presumably by reference to 
Montesquieu, that “when the spirit of compromise fades, the spirit of the 
laws suffers” (24, 204). It is not clear what the authors mean by the “spirit of 
the laws” and how it differs from other “spirits” more generally, and this is 
a shame as the term features so prominently in the book’s title.
Constitutional compromises are often central in the book (54–61), even 
though the constitutional law-making institutions and processes are very dif-
ferent from those of ordinary legislation. Moreover, it is not entirely clear 
why the authors chose to contrast campaigning to governing, as if the latter 
only referred to executive decision making (Ch. 4). Finally, the law-making 
process and compromising therein are incompletely grasped if one eludes the 
judiciary. This is even more important in the context of concrete decisions on 
principles and values. Legislation on such issues is usually abstract and 
requires judicial decisions for the specification of the relevant duties. As a 
result, it is usually at the judicial level that compromises are taken, if at all, 
and it is there that concerns for coherence arise.
These three sets of comments aimed at showing why the compromising 
mindset should not be construed necessarily as uncompromisingly as the 
book does. But I would not detract from the courage of a political theory 
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book that takes the authors’ country’s current practice of democratic politics 
seriously and makes concrete proposals to reform it. After all, uncompromis-
ingly endorsing compromising compromises may well be a risk worth taking 
in an “uncompromising time” (140).
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Do we need philosophy to make sense of Zionism? In recent years, dissident 
Jewish scholars have argued that Zionism is best fought with philosophical 
ammunition. At first glance, this faith in philosophy’s political purchase 
might appear misplaced. It is not immediately obvious that Zionism poses a 
philosophical problem. Does the inability to honor principles of equality in 
Israel/Palestine reveal a philosophical mistake at Zionism’s inception? Or 
does the intractability of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict reflect more mundane 
obstacles to pragmatic compromise (e.g., high stakes, scarce resources, inter-
ested parties, entrenched enmity)? One’s skepticism about philosophy’s use-
fulness could increase upon examining some of the more prominent efforts in 
this genre—for they seldom manage to move the debate beyond the polemic 
surrounding Israel’s legitimacy. Although Judith Butler musters the consider-
able resources of continental philosophy, her indictment of Zionism (in 
Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism) repeats standard 
tropes of settler colonialism. Eyal Chowers shares the view that we need 
philosophy to understand Zionism, which he approaches as an internal critic. 
Yet, unlike other philosophical critics, Chowers manages to “move the dis-
cussion on Zionism to another level of inquiry” by asking political-theoreti-
cal questions (13). In The Political Philosophy of Zionism, Chowers uses 
philosophy to expose the inadequacy of extant categories for understanding 
Zionism. Uncovering the metaphysical, temporal, and linguistic assumptions 
on which Zionism rests, Chowers contends that Zionism is best understood as 
a promethean modernism—rather than a nineteenth-century nationalism or a 
settler colonialism. With this compelling new approach, Chowers exposes a 
curious political lacuna at the heart of one of modernity’s most successful 
political movements.
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